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Abstract
We present a causal view on the robustness of neu-
ral networks against input manipulations, which
applies not only to traditional classification tasks
but also to general measurement data. Based on
this view, we design a deep causal manipulation
augmented model (deep CAMA) which explicitly
models possible manipulations on certain causes
leading to changes in the observed effect. We
further develop data augmentation and test-time
fine-tuning methods to improve deep CAMA’s
robustness. When compared with discriminative
deep neural networks, our proposed model shows
superior robustness against unseen manipulations.
As a by-product, our model achieves disentangled
representation which separates the representation
of manipulations from those of other latent causes.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have great success in many
real-life applications, however, they are easily fooled even
by a tiny amount of perturbation (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Athalye
et al., 2018). Lack of robustness hinders the application
of DNNs to critical decision making tasks such as uses in
health care. To address this, a deep learning practitioner may
suggest training DNNs with datasets that are not only big
but also diverse. Indeed, data augmentation and adversarial
training have shown improvements in both the generaliza-
tion and robustness of DNNs (Kurakin et al., 2016; Perez
& Wang, 2017; Madry et al., 2017). Unfortunately, this
does not address the vulnerability of DNNs for unseen ma-
nipulations. For example, as shown in Figure 1, a DNN
trained on clean MNIST digits fails to classify shifted dig-
its. Although observing (adversarial) perturbations of clean
data in training improves robustness against that particular
manipulation (the green line), the DNN is still fragile when
unseen manipulations are present (orange line). Since it is
unrealistic to augment the training data towards all possible
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Figure 1. Robustness results for DNNs on shifted MNIST. Panels
(a) and (b) show the accuracy on classifying noisy test data gener-
ated by shifting the digits vertically (Ver) and horizontally (Hor). It
shows that data augmentation during training makes generalization
to unseen shifts worse (orange versus blue lines).
manipulations that many occur, a principled method that
fundamentally improves the robustness is much needed.
On the other hand, thanks to the generative view, or the
capability of causal reasoning, human perception is adaptive
and robust to such perturbations. After learning the con-
cept of an “elephant”, a child can identify the elephant in
a photo taken under any lightning condition, location, etc.
In the causal view, the lightning condition and the location
are causes of the presented scene, which can be intervened
without changing the presence of the elephant. However,
many machine learning methods do not take possible inter-
ventions into account, but make use of only the provided
data, and cannot adapt the predictor for new data gathered
with unseen manipulation. Therefore we argue that the in-
capability of causal reasoning (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018;
Gopnik et al., 2004) is the reason of DNN’s vulnerability to
(adversarial) data manipulations.
This work discusses the robustness of DNNs from a causal
perspective. Our contributions are:
• A causal view on robustness of neural networks.
We argue from a causal perspective that adversarial
examples for a model can be generated by manipula-
tions on the effect variables and/or their unseen causes.
Therefore DNN’s vulnerability to adversarial attacks is
due to the lack of causal understanding.
• A causal inspired deep generative model.
We design a causal inspired deep generative model
which takes into account possible interventions on
the causes in the data generation process (Woodward,
2005). Accompanied with this model is a test-time in-
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ference method to learn unseen interventions and thus
improve classification accuracy on manipulated inputs.
Compared to DNNs, experiments on both MNIST and
a measurement-based dataset show that our model is
significantly more robustness to unseen manipulations.
2. A Causal View on Robustness of Neural
Networks
Discriminative DNNs are not robust to manipulations such
as adversarial noise injection (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Car-
lini & Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018), rotation and
shift. They simply trust the observed data and ignore the
constraints of the data generating process, which leads to
overfiting to nuisance factors that do not cause the ground
truth labels. By exploiting the overfit to the nuisance fac-
tors, an adversary can easily manipulate the inputs to fool
discriminative DNNs into predicting the wrong outcomes.
On the contrary, human can easily recognize an object in a
scene and be indifferent to the variations in other aspects
such as background, viewing angle, the presence of a sticker
to the object, etc. More importantly, human recognition is
less affected even by drastic perturbations, e.g. variations
in the lighting condition. We argue that the main difference
here is due to our ability to perform causal reasoning, which
identifies factor that are not relevant to the recognition re-
sults (Freeman, 1994; Peters et al., 2017; Parascandolo et al.,
2017). This leads to robust human perception to not only
a certain type of perturbations, but also to many types of
unseen manipulations which is caused by intervention on
other factors. Thus we argue that one should incorporate
causal perspective into model design, and make the model
robust on the level of different types of manipulations.
Before presenting our causally informed model, we first
define the generative process of perceived data. There might
exist multiple causes in the data generation process influenc-
ing the observed data X , and we visualize exemplar causal
graphs in Figure 2 with the arrows indicating causal asso-
ciations. Among these causes of X , Y is the target to be
predicted,M is a set of variables which can be intervened ar-
tificially, and Z represents the rest of the causes that cannot
be intervened in the application context. Take hand-written
digit classification for example, X is the image and Y is
the class label. The appearance of X is an effect of the
digit number Y , latent causes Z such as writing styles, and
possible manipulations M , such as rotation or translation.
We can thus define valid attacks through the lens of causal-
ity. Datasets are produced by interventions in general, so do
adversarial examples. Therefore defining a valid attack is
equivalent to defining a set of variables in the causal graph
(Figure 2) which can be intervened by the adversary. We
argue that a valid attack is an intervention on M which, to-
X
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(a) factorized
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Figure 2. Exampler causal graphs with Y , Z, M causing X . Y
might cause M (panel b), or they might be confounded (panel c).
gether with the original Y and Z, produces the manipulated
data X . We do not consider interventions on Y and Z (and
their causes): interventions on Y (and its causes) changes
the “true” value of the target and do not correspond to the
type of attacks we are considering; by definition Z (and its
causes) cannot be intervened artificially thereby unavailable
to the adversary. In this regard, recent adversarial attacks
can be considered as a specific type of intervention on M
such that a learned predictor is deceived.
In light of the above definition on valid attacks, it is clear
that performing prediction adaptive to the (unknown) inter-
vention is necessary to achieve robustness to manipulated
data. A natural way to build such adaptive predictor is to
construct a model that perform reasoning in a way consis-
tent to the causal process. To see this, note that a valid
attack changes the value of M , but it leaves the functional
relationship from M and Y to X intact. This is known as
modularity property (Woodward, 2005), and in this sense
the causal system is autonomous (Pearl, 2009). Therefore a
causally consistent predictive model is expected to be able
to learn this functional relationship from data, and adapt
the prediction result of target in test time according to its
reasoning on the underlying causal factors.
3. The Causal Manipulation Augmented
Model
We propose a deep CAusal Manipulation Augmented model
(deep CAMA), which takes into account the causal rela-
tionship for model design. We also design a fine-tuning
algorithm to enable adaptive reasoning of deep CAMA for
unseen manipulations on effect variables. The robustness
can be further improved by training-time data augmenta-
tion, without sacrificing the generalization ability to unseen
manipulations. Below we first present the deep CAMA
for single modality data, and then present a generic deep
CAMA for multimodality measurement data.
3.1. Deep CAMA for single modality data
The task of predicting Y from X covers a wide range of ap-
plications such as image/speech recognition and sentiment
analysis. Normally a discriminative DNN takes X as input
and directly predicts (the distribution of) the target variable
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Figure 3. Graphical presentation of proposed causally consistent
deep generative model for single modal data.
Figure 4. The network architecture. Shaded areas show the selec-
tive part for do(m) training and the fine-tune method, respectively.
Y . Generative classifiers, on the other hand, build a genera-
tive model Y → X , and use Bayes’ rule for predicting Y
given X: p(y|x) = p(y)p(x|y)/p(x).
We design deep CAMA (Figure 3) following the causal
graph in Figure 2(a), which returns a factorized model:
pθ(x, y, z,m) = p(m)p(z)p(y)pθ(x|y, z,m). (1)
Notice that we do not consider modelling dependencies
between Y and M even when the causal relationship might
exist (see Figures 2(b) and 2(c)) in the generation process
of the training data. By our definition of valid attack, M
is intervened (i.e. do(m)), which blocks the influence from
Y to M , and the generation process of manipulated data
reduces to the factorised case (Figure 2(a)).
For efficient inference we use amortized inference (Kingma
& Welling, 2013; Rezende et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2018)
and define an inference network for posterior approximation:
qφ(z,m|x, y) = qφ1(z|x, y,m)qφ2(m|x). (2)
We use φ to denote all the parameters of the encoder net-
work; here φ = {φ1, φ2}, where φ1 is the parameter
for the encoder network for the variational distribution
qφ1(z|x, y,m), and φ2 is used for the qφ2(m|x) part. Here
we assume that givenX , Y does not contain further informa-
tion aboutM (as a consequence, Y andM are conditionally
independent givenX , although it is not implied in the graph-
ical representation), and it is clearly the case if X contains
all the information ofM . Therefore in qφ2(m|x) we only ex-
tract the information of M form X , which, as we shall show
later, allows deep CAMA to learn unseen manipulations.
The network architecture is presented in Figure 4. For the
p model, the cause variables Y , Z and M are first trans-
formed into feature vectors hY , hZ and hM . Later, these
features are merged together and then passed through an-
other neural network to produce the distributional parame-
ters of pθ(x|y, z,m). For the approximate posterior q, two
different networks are used to compute the distributional
parameters of qφ2(m|x) and qφ1(z|x, y,m), respectively.
Model training We describe the training procedure for
two different scenarios. First, assume that during training,
the model observes clean data D = {(xn, yn)} only. In this
case we set the manipulation variable M to a null value,
e.g. do(m = 0). and train deep CAMA by maximizing the
likelihood function log p(x, y|do(m = 0)) under training
data. As there is no incoming edges to the manipulation
variable M , the do-calculus can be reduced to the condi-
tional distribution p(x, y|do(m = 0)) = p(x, y|m = 0).
Since this marginal distribution is intractable, we instead
maximize the intervention evidence lower-bound (ELBO)
with do(m = 0), i.e. maxθ,φ ED[ELBO(x, y, do(m = 0))],
with the ELBO derived in appenfix A and defined as:
ELBO(x, y, do(m = 0))
:=Eqφ1 (z|x,y,m=0)
[
log
pθ(x|y, z,m = 0)p(y)p(z)
qφ1(z|x, y,m = 0)
]
.
(3)
If manipulated data D′ is available during training, then
similar to data augmentation and adversarial training (Good-
fellow et al., 2015; Trame`r et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2017),
we can augment the training data with such data. We
still use the intervention ELBO (3) for clean data. For
the manipulated instances, we can either use the interven-
tion ELBO with do(m = m0) when the manipulated data
D′ = {(m0(x), y)} is generated by a known intervention
m0, or, as done in our experiments, infer the latent variable
M for unknown manipulations. This is achieved by maxi-
mizing the ELBO on the joint distribution log p(x, y) using
manipulated data:
ELBO(x, y) := Eqφ(z,m|x,y)
[
log
pθ(x, y, z,m)
qφ(z,m|x, y)
]
, (4)
so the total loss function to be maximized is defined as
Laug(θ, φ) =λED[ELBO(x, y, do(m = 0))]
+ (1− λ)ED′ [ELBO(x, y)].
(5)
Our causally consistent model effectively disentangles the
latent representation: Z models the unknown causes in the
clean data, such as personal writing style; and M models
possible manipulations or intervention on the underlying
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factors, which the model should be robust to, such as shift,
rotation, noise etc. From a causal perspective, the mech-
anism of generating X from its causes is invariant to the
interventions on M . Thus, in our model the functional re-
lationships Y → X and Z → X remain intact even in the
presence of manipulated data. As a result, deep CAMA’s
can still generalize to unseen manipulations even after see-
ing lots of manipulated datapoints from other manipulations,
in contrast to the behavior of discriminative DNNs as shown
in Figure 1.
Prediction In general the test data D˜ can be manipulated
with an unseen intervention, for which we wish our model
to be robust to. Thus, at test-time, M is unknown, and deep
CAMA classifies an unseen test data x∗, using a Monte
Carlo approximation to Bayes’ rule with samples mu ∼
qφ2(m|x), zkc ∼ qφ1(z|x∗, yc,mu):
p(y∗|x∗) = p(x
∗|y∗)p(y∗)
p(x∗)
(6)
≈ softmaxCc=1
[
log
K∑
k=1
pθ(x|y, zkc ,mu)p(yc)p(z)
qφ1(z
k
c |x∗, yc,mu)
]
.
In addition, deep CAMA can be adapted to the unseen
manipulations present at test time without labels on the
manipulated data. From the causal graph, the conditional
distributions p(x|y) and p(x|z) are invariant to the interven-
tions on X based on the modularity property. However, we
would like to learn the manipulation mechanism M → X ,
and, given that the number of possible interventions on M
might be infinity, the model may be underfitted for this func-
tional relationship, given limited data. Fine-tuning on the
current observation can be beneficial to address this under-
fiting issue, thereby hopefully making deep CAMA more
robust. As shown in Figure 4, for the generative model,
we only fine-tune the networks that are dependent only on
M , i.e. NNpM by maximizing the ELBO of the marginal
distribution log p(x):
ELBO(x) := log
[
C∑
c=1
exp[ELBO(x, yc)]
]
. (7)
To reduce the possibly negative effect of fine-tuning
to model generalization, we use a shallow network for
NNpmerge and deep networks for NN
p
M , NN
p
Y and NN
p
Z .
We also fine-tune the network NNqM for the approximate
posterior q since M is involved in the inference of Z. In
sum, in fine-tuning the selective part of the deep CAMA
model is trained to maximize the following objective:
Lft(θ, φ) = αED[ELBO(x, y)] + (1− α)ED˜[ELBO(x)].
(8)
The intervention ELBO can also be used for D.
YC1 C2
A1 A2
X1 X2
Figure 5. The Markov Blan-
ket of target variable Y
X
Y C Z M
A
Figure 6. Graphical presenta-
tion of deep CAMA for
generic measurement data.
Notice that there may exist infinitely many manipulations
and it is impossible to observe all of them at training time.
Therefore by fine-tuning at test-time, the model can be
adapted to unseen manipulation which is desirable in many
real-life applications. As shown in our experiments, the
proposed deep CAMA model and the training methods are
capable of improving the robustness of the generative clas-
sifier to unseen manipulations.
3.2. Deep CAMA for generic measurement data
We now discuss a generic version of deep CAMA to handle
multimodality in measurement data. To predict the target
variable Y in a directed acyclic graph, only variables in the
Markov blanket of Y (shown in Figure 5) are needed. This
includes the parents (A), children (X), and co-parents (C)
of the target Y . Similar to the single modal case above, here
a valid manipulation can only be independent mechanisms
applied to X or C to ensure that both Y and the relationship
from Y to X remain intact.
We design the generic deep CAMA (shown in Figure 6)
following the causal process in Figure 5. Unlike discrimina-
tive DNNs where A, C and X are used together to predict
Y directly, we consider the full causal process and treat
them separately. Building on the deep CAMA for single
modality data, we add the extra consideration of the parent
and observed co-parent of Y , while modelling the latent
unobserved cause in Z and potential manipulations in M .
We do not need to model manipulation on C as they are
out of the Markov Blanket of Y . Thus, our model and the
approximate inference network are defined as:
pθ(x, y, z,m, a, c)
= p(a)p(m)p(z)p(c)pθ1(y|a)pθ2(x|y, c, z,m),
(9)
qφ(z,m|x, y, a, c) = qφ1(z|x, y,m, a, c)qφ2(m|x). (10)
Training, fine-tuning and prediction proceed in the same
way as in the single modality case (Section 3.1) with do(m)
operations and Monte Carlo approximations. As we only
fine-tune the networks that are dependent on M , similar
reasoning indicates that the multimodality deep CAMA is
robust to manipulations directly on the effect variable X .
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Figure 7. Model robustness results on horizontal shifts (top) and vertical shifts (bottom).
Our model is also robust to changes of X caused by inter-
vention on the co-parents C by design. By our definition of
valid manipulation, perturbing C is valid as it only leads to
the changes in X . If the underlying model from Y and C to
X remains the same, and the trained model learns p(x|y, c)
perfectly, then our model is perfectly robust to such changes.
This is because we use Bayes’ rule for prediction:
p(y|a, x, c) = p(y|a)p(a)p(c)p(x|y, c)
p(a)p(c)
∫
y
p(y|a)p(x|y, c)
=
p(y|a)p(x|y, c)∫
y
p(y|a)p(x|y, c) ,
(11)
and the manipulations on C (thus changing X) do not af-
fect the conditional distribution p(x|y, c) in the generative
classifier (Eq. 11). In contrast, discriminative DNNs con-
catenateX ,C,A together and map these variables to Y , and
therefore it fails to make use of the invariant mechanisms.
4. Experiments
In this section, we first show the robustness of deep CAMA
for image classification using both MNIST and a binary clas-
sification task derived from CIFAR-10. Then, we demon-
strate the behaviour of our generic deep CAMA for mea-
surement data. We evaluated the performance of CAMA
on both manipulations such as shifting and adverserial ex-
amples generated using the CleverHans package (Papernot
et al., 2018). More results with different DNN architectures
and different manipulations are shown in the appendix.
4.1. Robustness test on image classification with Deep
CAMA
We first demonstrate the robustness of our model against
vertical (VT) and horizontal (HT) shifts. Details such as
network architectures are presented in the appendix.
Training with clean MNIST data only. Figure 7 shows
the results for deep CAMA trained on clean data only. Deep
CAMA without fine-tuning (orange lines) perform similarly
to a DNN (blue lines) on horizontally shifted images, but
it is more robust to vertical shifts. The advantage of deep
CAMA is clear when fine-tuning is used at test time (green
lines): fine-tuning on manipulated test data with the same
shift clearly improves the robustness of the network (panels
7(b) and 7(d)). We further inspect the generalization of deep
CAMA to unseen manipulation after fine-tuning in unrelated
manipulation in panels 7(a) and 7(e). The robustness of the
model fine-tuned for other manipulated data does not drop,
which is desired and different to discriminate DNN. This
shows that our model is capable of learning manipulations
in an unsupervised manner, without deteriorating the gen-
eralization ability to unseen manipulations. Lastly, panels
7(c) and 7(f) show the robustness of our model to both shifts
when both types of manipulation are used for fine-tuning,
and we see clear improvements over both manipulations.
Training with augmented MNIST data We explore the
setting where the training data is augmented with manipu-
lated data. As discussed in Section 3.1, here deep CAMA
naturally learns disentangled representation due to its causal
reasoning capacity. Indeed this is confirmed by Figure 9,
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Figure 9. Visualization of the disentangled representation.
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Figure 10. Performance of our model against different manipula-
tion (c.f. Figure 1).
where panel 9(b) shows the reconstructions of manipulated
data from panel 9(a) with do(m = 0). In this case the model
keeps the identity of the digits but moves them to the center
of the image. Recall that do(m = 0) corresponds to clean
data which contains centered digits. This shows that deep
CAMA can disentangle the intrinsic unknown style Z and
the shifting manipulation variable M .
We show the robustness results of deep CAMA with aug-
mented training in Figure 10 (cf. Figure 1). Here shift range
0.5 is used to augment the training data. Take the verti-
cal shift test in panel 10(a) for example. When vertically
shifted data are augmented to the training set, the test per-
formance without fine-tuning (green line) is significantly
better. Further, fine-tuning (brown line) brings in even larger
improvement for large scale shifts. On the other hand, deep
CAMA maintains robustness on vertically shifted data when
trained with horizontally shifted data, which is different
from discriminative DNN’s overfiting behaviour (Figure 1).
Therefore, our model does not overfit to a specific type of
manipulations, at the same time further fine-tuning can im-
prove the robustness against new manipulations in the test
set (pink line). The same conclusion holds in panel 10(b).
We also quantify the amount of manipulated data required
for fine-tuning in order to improve the robustness of deep
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Figure 11. Test accuracy on MNIST adversarial examples.
CAMA models. As shown in Figure 8, even using 1% of
the manipulated data is sufficient to learn the vertical shift
manipulation presented in the test set.
Adversarial Attack Test on MNIST We further test deep
CAMA’s robustness against two adversarial attacks: fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and
projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2017). Note
that, these attacks are specially developed for images with
the small perturbation constraint. However, theses attack
does not have guarantee to be valid by our definition as the
manipulation depends on the class label Y , which has the
risk of changing the ground-truth label. Such risk has also
been discussed in Elsayed et al. (2018). Figure 11 show
the results comparing deep CAMA and the DNN; both are
trained on clean images only. Deep CAMA is significantly
more robust to both attacks than the DNN (orange line), and
with fine-tuning, deep CAMA shows additional 20%− 40%
accuracy increase. We also show the clean data test accuracy
after fine-tuning maintains to be the same thanks to our
causal consistent model design.
Adversarial attack test on natural image classification
We evaluate the adversarial robustness of deep CAMA when
trained on natural images. In this case we follow Li et al.
(2018) and consider CIFAR-binary, a binary classification
dataset containing airplane and frog images from CIFAR-10.
We choose to work with CIFAR-binary because VAE-based
fully generative classifiers are less satisfactory for classify-
ing clean CIFAR-10 images (< 50% clean test accuracy).
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Figure 12. Adversarial robustness results on CIFAR-binary data.
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Figure 13. Adversarial robustness results on measurement data.
The deep CAMA model trained with data augmentation
(adding Gaussian noise with standard deviation 0.1, see ob-
jective (5)) achieves 88.85% clean test accuracy on CIFAR-
binary, which is on par with the results reported in Li et al.
(2018). For reference, a discriminative CNN with 2× more
channels achieves 95.60% clean test accuracy. Similar to
previous sections we apply FGSM and PGD attacks with
different  values to both deep CAMA and the discrimi-
native CNN, and evaluate classification accuracies on the
adversarial examples before and after finetuning.
Results are reported in Figure 12. For both FGSM and PGD
tests, we see that deep CAMA, before finetuning, is signif-
icantly more robust to adversarial attacks when compared
with a discriminative CNN model. Regarding finetuning,
although PGD with large distortion ( = 0.2) also fools
the finetuning mechanism, in other cases finetuning still
provides modest improvements (5% to 8% when compared
with the vanilla deep CAMA model) without deteriorating
test accuracy on clean data. Combined with adversarial ro-
bustness results on MNIST, we conjecture that with a better
generative model on natural images the robustness of deep
CAMA can be further improved.
4.2. Robustness test on measurement based data with
generalized Deep CAMA
Our causal view on valid manipulations allows us to test
model robustness on generic measurement data. Unfortu-
nately, there exists no public multi-variate dataset where
ground truth causal relationships are known. Therefore we
generate synthetic data (see appendix) following a causal
process, and test the performance of the generic deep CAMA
on this measurement data. We use Gaussian variables for A,
C and X , and categorical variables for Y . All the ground
truth causal relationships are nonlinear (quadratic mainly).
Manipulation Test First, we test manipulations on co-
parents, C, while keeping the ground truth causal influence
from C to X static. Thus, both C and X change. We ma-
nipulate C by shifting it up or down, which is a reasonable
analogy to the noisiness in measurement data. For example,
in medical measurement data, different doctors may have
different subjective standards while examining the patients,
thus the same measurement can be shifted up or down. Fig-
ure 14 shows the result: compared to a discriminatively
trained DNN, deep CAMA is significantly more robust to
a wide range of manipulations. However, when the range
of the shifting manipulations increases, the classification
accuracy of the discriminative DNN drops drastically. This
confirms our theory in Section 3.2 that manipulations in C
do not affect the decision making of deep CAMA, and there-
fore our model is more robust to manipulation on co-parents
as compared to discriminative DNNs.
Figure 15 shows the performance of the generic deep CAMA
with shifted X , and the model only sees clean data at train-
ing time. While deep CAMA achieves the same accuracy as
a discriminative DNN on clean data, it is again significantly
more robust to manipulations even without fine-tuning (the
orange line vs the blue line). This robustness is further
improved by fine-tuning (green line), especially when the
amount of distortion is large. The red line shows that deep
CAMA’s test accuracy on clean data, which does not drop
after fine-tuning on different shifts. This further confirms
that during test time, fine-tuning learns the influence of M
without affecting the causal relationships between Y and Z.
Adversarial Attack Test Lastly we evaluate the adversar-
ial robustness of the generalized CAMA model. We only al-
low attacks on the childrenX and co-parentsC according to
our definition of valid attacks. This applies to both DNN and
CAMA. Figure 13 shows the results in terms of test accuracy
with adversarial examples generated using FGSM and PGD
attack methods. Again deep CAMA demonstrate signifi-
cantly improved robustness against adversarial attacks, and
fine-tuning further provides improvements on robustness
while keeping high accuracy on clean test examples.
5. Related Work
Adversarial robustness Adversarial attacks can easily
fool a discriminative DNN for vision/speech/language mod-
elling tasks by adding imperceptible perturbations (Carlini
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Figure 15. Manipulate children
& Wagner, 2018; Alzantot et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner,
2017b; Szegedy et al., 2013; Papernot et al., 2017). Ad-
versarial training (Madry et al., 2017; Trame`r et al., 2018)
has shown some success in defending attacks, however,
these techniques assume the knowledge of the adversary
and present the perturbation to the model during training.
Still, a discriminative model after adversarial training is
vulnerable to unseen manipulations. Deep generative mod-
elling has recently been applied as a defence mechanism to
adversarial attacks. Specifically, existing work considered
de-noising adversarial examples before feeding these inputs
to the discriminative classifier (Song et al., 2018; Saman-
gouei et al., 2018). Very recently, research revisited (deep)
generative classifiers and provided evidence that they are
more robust to adversarial attacks (Li et al., 2018; Schott
et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2018).
Causal learning Causal inference has a long history in
statistical research (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2009; Peters
et al., 2017; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). Although it has fun-
damental importance, the causal view has not been widely
incorporated to the robustness analysis of neural networks
on unseen manipulations. The most relevant work is in
applying the existing causal views to transfer learning and
domain adaption (Zhang et al., 2013; Stojanov et al., 2019;
Zhao et al., 2019; Gong et al., 2016), where the difference
in various domains are treated as either target shift or con-
ditional shift from a causal perspective. As an extension to
the domain adaptation work, Rothenha¨usler et al. (2018);
Heinze-Deml & Meinshausen (2017); Arjovsky et al. (2019)
also discussed learning robust predictors across different
domains. However, in these approaches the domain is speci-
fied either explicitly or though exemplar paired points, thus
an unseen manipulation is not explicitly considered. In ad-
dition, interventions are considered only on a dataset level
in domain adaption tasks, whereas we consider interven-
tions on single data points, thus addressing a more general
problem. By contrast, our proposed method does not rely
on any given domain information. Another related area is
causal feature selection (Aliferis et al., 2010), where causal
discovery is applied first and features in the Markov Blan-
ket of the prediction target are selected. We also note that
CAMA’s design is aligned with causal and anti-causal learn-
ing analyses (Scho¨lkopf et al., 2012; Kilbertus et al., 2018),
in that CAMA models the causal mechanism Y → X and
use Bayes’ rule for anti-causal prediction. Different from
Scho¨lkopf et al. (2012), CAMA is not limited to only two
endogenous variables; rather it provides more generic de-
sign handling latent causes that correspond to both intrinsic
variations and data manipulations.
Disentangled representations Learning disentangled
representations has become a trendy research topic in recent
representation learning literature. Considerable effort went
to developing training objectives, e.g. β-VAE (Higgins et al.,
2017) and other information theoretic approaches (Kim &
Mnih, 2018; Chen et al., 2018). Additionally, different fac-
torization structure in graphical model design has also been
explored for disentanglement (Narayanaswamy et al., 2017;
Li & Mandt, 2018). The deep CAMA model is motivated
by the causal process of data manipulations, which differs
from the model used in Narayanaswamy et al. (2017) in that
the latent variables have different meanings. See appendix
for a detailed discussion. Furthermore test-time fine-tuning
allows deep CAMA to better adapt to unseen manipulations,
which is shown to be useful for improving robustness.
6. Discussion
We have provided a causal view on the robustness of neural
networks, showing that the vulnerability of discriminative
DNNs can be explained by the lack of causal reasoning.
We defined valid attacks under this causal view, which are
intervention of the data though its causal factors which are
not the target label or the ancestor of the target label. of
the target variables, independent of the target and/or the
cause of the target. We further proposed a deep causal
manipulation augmented model (deep CAMA), which fol-
lows the causal relationship in the model design, and can be
adapted to unseen manipulations at test time. Our model has
demonstrated improved robustness, even without adversarial
training. When manipulated data are available, our model’s
robustness increases for both seen and unseen manipulation.
Our framework is generic, however, manipulations can
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change over time, and a robust model should adapt to these
perturbations in a continuous manner. Our framework thus
should be adapted to online learning or continual learn-
ing settings. In future work, we will explore the continual
learning setting of deep CAMA where new manipulations
come in a sequence. In addition, our method is designed for
generic class-independent manipulations, therefore a natu-
ral extension would consider class-dependent manipulations
where M is an effect of Y or there is a confounder for M
and Y . Lastly out design excludes gradient-based adversar-
ial attacks which is dependent on both the target and the
victim model. As such attacks are commonly adopted in
machine learning, we would also like to extend our model
to such scenarios.
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A Causal View on Robustness of Neural Networks
A. Derivation Details
A.1. The intervention ELBO
When training with clean data D = {(xn, yn)}, we set the manipulation variable M to a null value, e.g. do(m = 0). In this
case we would like to maximise the log-likelihood of the intervened model, i.e.
max
θ
ED[log pθ(x, y|do(m = 0))].
This log-likelihood of the intervened model is defined by integrating out the unobserved latent variable Z in the intervened
joint distribution, and from do-calculus we have
log pθ(x, y|do(m = 0)) = log
∫
pθ(x, y, z|do(m = 0))dz
= log
∫
pθ(x|y, z,m = 0)p(y)p(z)dz.
(12)
A variational lower-bound (or ELBO) of the log-likelihood uses a variational distribution q(z|·)
log pθ(x, y|do(m = 0)) = log
∫
pθ(x|y, z,m = 0)p(y)p(z)q(z|·)
q(z|·)dz
≥ Eq(z|·)
[
log
pθ(x|y, z,m = 0)p(y)p(z)
q(z|·)
]
.
(13)
The lower-bound holds for arbitrary q(z|·) as long as it is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the posterior distribution
pθ(z|x, y, do(m = 0)) of the intervened model. Now recall the design of the inference network/variational distribu-
tion in the main text:
qφ(z,m|x, y) = qφ1(z|x, y,m)qφ2(m|x),
where φ1 and φ2 are the inference network parameters of the corresponding variational distributions. Performing an
intervention do(m = 0) on this q distribution gives
qφ(z|x, y, do(m = 0)) = qφ1(z|x, y,m = 0).
Defining q(z|·) = qφ1(z|x, y, do(m = 0)) and plugging-in it to eq. (13) return the intervention ELBO objective (3) presented
in the main text.
A.2. The ELBO for unlabelled test data
The proposed fine-tuning method in the main text require optimising the marginal log-likelihood log pθ(x) for x ∼ D˜,
which is clearly intractable. Instead of using a variational distribution for the unobserved class label Y , we consider the
variational lower-bound of log pθ(x, y) for all possible y = yc:
log pθ(x, y) = log
∫
pθ(x, y, z,m)dzdm
= log
∫
pθ(x, y, z,m)
qφ(z,m|x, y)
qφ(z,m|x, y)dzdm
≥ Eqφ(z,m|x,y)
[
log
pθ(x, y, z,m)
qφ(z,m|x, y)
]
:= ELBO(x, y).
(14)
Since both logarithm and exponent functions preserve monotonicity, and for all yc, c = 1, ..., C we have log pθ(x, yc) ≥
ELBO(x, yc), we have
log pθ(x, yc) ≥ ELBO(x, yc),∀c ⇒ pθ(x, yc) ≥ exp[ELBO(x, yc)],∀c
⇒ log p(x) = log
[
C∑
c=1
pθ(x, yc)
]
≥ log
[
C∑
c=1
exp[ELBO(x, yc)]
]
:= ELBO(x),
which justifies the ELBO objective (7) defined in the main text.
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B. Additional Results
CNN We also performed experiments using different DNN network architectures. The convolution layers in CNN are
designed to be robust to shifts. Thus, we test these vertical and horizontal shifts with a standard CNN architecture as used in
https://keras.io/examples/cifar10_cnn/. 4 convolution layers are used in this architecture.
Figure 16 shows the performance against different shifts. We see that adding vertical shifts to the training data clearly
harmed the robustness performances to unseen horizontal shifts as shown in 17(b). Adding horizontal shifted images in
training did not influences the performance on vertical shifts much. Thus, we see that using different architectures of DNN,
even the one that are designed to be robust to these manipulations, lack of generalization ability to unseen data is a common
problem.
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Figure 16. Robustness results for DNNs against different manipulations on MNIST using CNN. Panels (a) and (b) show the accuracy on
classifying noisy test data generated by shifting the digits vertically (vt) and horizontally (ht). It shows that data augmentation during
training makes generalization to unseen shifts worse (orange versus blue lines).
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Figure 17. Robustness results for DNNs against different manipulations on MNIST using a large MLP. Panels (a) and (b) show the
accuracy on classifying noisy test data generated by shifting the digits vertically (vt) and horizontally (ht). It shows that data augmentation
during training makes generalization to unseen shifts worse (orange versus blue lines).
Enlarge Network Size Here we exam whether network capacity has any influence on the robustness performance to
unseen manipulation. We use a wider network with [1024, 512, 512, 1024] units in each hidden layer instead of [512, 256,
126, 512] sized network in the paper. Figure 17 shows the robustness performance using this enlarged network. We observe
the similar degree of over-fitting to the augmented data. The penalization ability shows no improvement by enlarging the
network sizes.
ZCA Whitening Manipulation Our result does not limited to shifts, it generalizes to other manipulations. Figure 18
compare the result from training with clean images and training with ZCA whitening images added. We see that adding
A Causal View on Robustness of Neural Networks
ZCA whitening images in training harm both robustness against vertical shift and horizontal shift.
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Figure 18. ZCA Whitening manipulation result. Figure shows the robustness results for DNNs against different manipulations on MNIST
using CNN. The blue curve shows that result from training with clean data. The orange curve shows that result from training with zca
whitening data added.
Additional Figures In addition to Figure 8, We also show the result testing with Vertical shift show in Figure 19, where a
smaller NpM network ([dimM, 500, 500]) is used. The conclusion is the same was using the vertical shift. We need very few
data for fine-tune. More than 1% data is sufficient.
Similar as Figure 8, we show the result using different percentage of data for fine-tuning in this experiment setting in 20.
B.1. Addition discussions on comparisons to Narayanaswamy et al. (2017)
Narayanaswamy et al. (2017) proposed a semi-supervised learning algorithm to learn disentangled representation for deep
generative models. Their approach is generic, which only defines a joint distribution p(x, y, z) as the model, and learn this
model using the VAE approach. In their definition, X is the observed data, Y is a set of variables that are “interpretable”
depending on the data context, and Z denotes the remaining implicit features. This means in their model Y is not limited to
representing the prediction target; indeed their “intrinsic face” example the interpretable variables Y include lightning and
shading of the face image. Then semi-supervised learning algorithm achieves disentanglement by assuming the existence of
a few supervision signal for the “interpretable variables” Y .
On the other hand, in the proposed deep CAMA model the latent variables have very different meanings. Apart from the fact
that Y is solely used to represent the prediction target, the M and Z variables are designed to separate the latent factors that
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Figure 19. Performance regarding different percentage of test
data used for fine-tuning manipulation of horizontal shift with-
out using do(m) = 0 for the cleaning training data during
fine-tuning.
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can or cannot be artificially intervened by the adversary. Disentanglement of M and Z is achieved by training the model
on interventional data (noisy data from valid manipulations). Furthermore the fine-tuning algorithm provides a test-time
adaptation scheme for the deep CAMA model, which is different from the semi-supervised learning approach proposed by
Narayanaswamy et al. (2017) which is conducted in training time. Importantly, the fine-tuning method updates the model
parameter in a selective manner, which is motivated by our analysis on the causal generation process of noisy data.
C. Experimental settings
Network architecture
• MNIST experiments:
– Discriminative DNN: The discriminate model used in the paper contains 4 densely connected hidden layer
of [512, 256, 126, 512] width for each layer. ReLU activations and dropout are used with dropout rate
[0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.5] for each layer.
– Deep CAMA’s p networks: we use dim(Y ) = 10, dim(Z) = 64 and dim(M) = 32.
NNpY : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(Y ), 500, 500] and ReLU activations.
NNpZ : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(Z), 500, 500] and ReLU activations.
NNpM : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(M), 500, 500, 500, 500] and ReLU activations.
NNpmerge: an projection layer which projects the feature outputs from the previous networks to a 3D tensor of shape
(4, 4, 64), followed by 3 deconvolutional layers with stride 2, SAME padding, filter size (3, 3, 64, 64) except
for the last layer (3, 3, 64, 1). All the layers use ReLU activations except for the last layer, which uses sigmoid
activation.
– Deep CAMA’s q networks:
NNqM : it starts from a convolutional neural network (CNN) with 3 blocks of {conv3× 3,max-pool} layers with
output channel size 64, stride 1 and SAME padding, then performs a reshape-to-vector operation and transforms
this vector with an MLP of layer sizes [4× 4× 64, 500, dim(M)× 2] to generate the mean and log-variance of
q(m|x). All the layers use ReLU activation except for the last layer, which uses linear activation.
NNqZ : first it uses a CNN with similar architecture as NN
M
q ’s CNN (except that the filter size is 5) to process x.
Then after the reshape-to-vector operation, the vector first gets transformed by an MLP of size [4×4×64, 500], then
it gets combined with y andm and passed through another MLP of size [500+dim(Y )+dim(M), 500, dim(Z)×2]
to obtain the mean and log-variance of q(z|x, y,m). All the layers use ReLU activation except for the last layer,
which uses linear activation.
• Measurement data experiments:
– Discriminative DNN: The A,C,X variables are concatenated to an input vector of total dimension 20. Then
the DNN contains 3 densely connected hidden layer of [64, 16, 32] width for each layer, and output Y . ReLU
activations and dropout are used with dropout rate [0.25, 0.25, 0.5] for each layer.
– Deep CAMA’s p networks: we use dim(Y ) = 5, dim(A) = 5, dim(C) = 5, dim(Z) = 64 and dim(M) = 32.
p(y|a): an MLP of layer sizes [dim(A), 500, 500, dim(Y )], ReLU activations except for the last layer (softmax).
p(x|y, c, z,m) contains 5 networks: 4 networks {NNpY ,NNpC ,NNpZ ,NNpM} to process each of the parents of X ,
followed by a merging network.
NNpY : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(Y ), 500, 500] and ReLU activations.
NNpC : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(C), 500, 500] and ReLU activations.
NNpZ an MLP of layer sizes [dim(Z), 500, 500] and ReLU activations.
NNpM : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(M), 500, 500, 500, 500] and ReLU activations.
NNpmerge: it first start from a concatenation of the feature outputs from the above 4 networks, then transforms the
concatenated vector with an MLP of layer sizes [500× 4, 500, dim(X)] to output the mean of x. All the layers
use ReLU activations except for the last layer, which uses linear activation.
– Deep CAMA’s q networks:
q(m|x): it uses an MLP of layer sizes [dim(X), 500, 500, dim(M)× 2] to obtain the mean and log-variance. All
the layers use ReLU activations except for the last layer, which uses linear activation.
q(z|x, y,m, a, c): it first concatenates x, y,m, a, c into a vecto, then uses an MLP of layer sizes [dim(X) +
A Causal View on Robustness of Neural Networks
dim(Y ) + dim(M) + dim(A) + dim(C), 500, 500, dim(Z)× 2] to transform this vector into the mean and log-
variance of q(z|x, y,m, a, c). All the layers use ReLU activations except for the last layer, which uses linear
activation.
• CIFAR-binary experiments:
– Discriminative CNN: The discriminate model used in the paper is a CNN with 3 convolutional layers of filter
width 3 and channel sizes [128, 128, 128], followed by a flattening operation and a 2-hidden layer MLP of size
[4× 4× 128, 1000, 1000, 10]. It uses ReLU activations and max pooling for the convolutional layers.
– Deep CAMA’s p networks: we use dim(Y ) = 10, dim(Z) = 128 and dim(M) = 64.
NNpY : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(Y ), 1000, 1000] and ReLU activations.
NNpZ : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(Z), 1000, 1000] and ReLU activations.
NNpM : an MLP of layer sizes [dim(M), 1000, 1000, 1000] and ReLU activations.
NNpmerge: an projection layer which projects the feature outputs from the previous networks to a 3D tensor of shape
(4, 4, 64), followed by 4 deconvolutional layers with stride 2, SAME padding, filter size (3, 3, 64, 64) except
for the last layer (3, 3, 64, 3). All the layers use ReLU activations except for the last layer, which uses sigmoid
activation.
– Deep CAMA’s q networks:
NNqM : it starts from a convolutional neural network (CNN) with 3 blocks of {conv3× 3,max-pool} layers with
output channel size 64, stride 1 and SAME padding, then performs a reshape-to-vector operation and transforms
this vector with an MLP of layer sizes [4×4×64, 1000, 1000, dim(M)×2] to generate the mean and log-variance
of q(m|x). All the layers use ReLU activation except for the last layer, which uses linear activation.
NNqZ : first it re-uses NN
q
M CNN network for feature extraction on x. Then after the reshape-to-vector operation,
the vector gets combined with y and m and passed through another MLP of size [4 × 4 × 64 + dim(Y ) +
dim(M), 1000, 1000, dim(Z)× 2] to obtain the mean and log-variance of q(z|x, y,m). All the layers use ReLU
activation except for the last layer, which uses linear activation.
Measurement data generation We set the target Y to be categorical, its children, co-parents and parents are continuous
variables. The set 5 classes for Y , and Y has 10 children variables and 5 co-parents variables, also one 5 dimensional
parents.
Parents (A) and co-parents (C) are generated by sampling from a normal distribution. We generate Y using structured
equation Y = fy(A) + σY . We use fy = argmax g(A) and g() is a quadratic function 0.2 ∗A2 − 0.8A. σY is the Gaussain
noise.
To generate the children X = f(Y,C) + σx, we also used quadratic function f and the parameters were sampled from a
Gaussian distribution. As in the experiment, we were using fixed scale shift, we also added a normalize the children before
adding the Gaussian random noise σx. So that all observations are in similar scale.
Other For MNIST experiments, we uses 5% of the training data as the validation set. We used the training results with the
highest validation accuracy for testing. If not otherwise specified, 50% of noisy test data are used for fine-tuning in the shift
experiments and all data are used for fine-tuning in the attack experiments.
For the experiments with measurement data. We generated 1000 data in total. We split, 500 data for testing, 450 for training
and 50 for validation. We used the training results with the highest validation accuracy for testing for both deep CAMA and
for DNN.
